The core of a scientific theory (in the broadest Quine-Duhemian, Kuhnian, Lakatos-sense) comprises criteria for the identity of certain objects – and that respect it is like a Kantian schema. So we might learn a thing or two about the notion of a scheme from comparing it with that of that of a core.
The core of, say, classical celestial mechanics comprises the general laws of motion and a good bulk of the metaphysics associated with Newton’s Principia. Now, of course, these core assumptions specifies certain parameters pertaining to the movements of celestial objects, but these parameters also has to be connected with celestial objects if it is to be a celestial theory at all. That is, it is only by being connected with a particular planetary system that the theory can serve as a model which allows computation, prediction and the like.
This is the first lesson: a schema is applied to objects.
Now it is also clear that the empirical observations pertaining to the particular planetary system are not mere conjuncts to the axiomatic core of the theory of celestial mechanics – contrary to popular opinion neither Quine nor Duhem ever claimed this either. They are more than this: they are the points at which the theory connects with reality; the Quinian web does touch reality. Only, it must be realized that these points derive their cognitive content from the theory. That is, they don’t form independent cognitive units.
This is the second lesson: the objects subsumed under a schema do not form independent cognitive units.
The empirical observations of particular planetary systems are however not possible solely with reference to the theory of classical celestial mechanics. Astronomical observations, as a minimum, presuppose a theory of optics and of gases in order to determine the propagation of light from the celestial objects to the observer. That is, the theory of classical celestial mechanics is not applied alone.
This is the third lesson: Schemes are necessarily multiple, since they are applied never alone.
It can always be discussed how precise such a conceptual exercise of comparing two concepts is, but in this case I certainly find it helpful.
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
Monday, June 02, 2008
Schematism...
From time to time, I read the Kant’s section on ‘schematism’ in Critique of Pure Reason. I’m never quite sure I understand it, and I can certainly never quite find myself in tune with its content.
A ’schema’ in its simplest sense is a way of identifying an object in time and space, or simply in inituition, kantianly speaking. If I speak of a ‘white shirt’ and if I’m able to identify white shirts within my experience and within time and space, then I have schematized the concept of a ‘white shirt’. I am able to project it into various contexts, I understand the concept.
But this is exactly my uneasiness with the concept of a ‘schema’. On the one hand, it seems an incredibly important concept if the above relation holds. On the other hand, if the above relation holds, it is hard to see the point in saying ‘I have schematized concept x’ rather than simply saying ‘I understand concept x’. What is the difference between having a schema for something and understanding that concept?
As a philosophical concept it seems either to be incredibly important or incredibly redundant.
What sort of content does the concept of a ‘schema’ carry? How, after all, is it suppose to enlighten, supplement or expand our concept of understanding? As far can I see, the only specific thing Kant says in this connection is that having a schema for a ‘dog’ is like possessing a dim image of a ‘dog’, which I can compare to the objects in my inituition thus identifying them as dogs [Kant’s example, CPR, B 180] – But this is ostensibly wrong, my understanding does not and cannot rest upon comparison with a picture of whatever nature, since this picture would itself have to be schematized in order to apply to real objects of experience. What we need to explain is exactly how my mental imagery and the real objects of my experience can be alike at all, and it’s no explanation to say that are indeed alike. Well, of course, they are. No shit, Sherlock.
PS: I know that I’m not very faithful to Kant’s own problematic here, its placement within the architecture of CPR etc.. I know. But.
A ’schema’ in its simplest sense is a way of identifying an object in time and space, or simply in inituition, kantianly speaking. If I speak of a ‘white shirt’ and if I’m able to identify white shirts within my experience and within time and space, then I have schematized the concept of a ‘white shirt’. I am able to project it into various contexts, I understand the concept.
But this is exactly my uneasiness with the concept of a ‘schema’. On the one hand, it seems an incredibly important concept if the above relation holds. On the other hand, if the above relation holds, it is hard to see the point in saying ‘I have schematized concept x’ rather than simply saying ‘I understand concept x’. What is the difference between having a schema for something and understanding that concept?
As a philosophical concept it seems either to be incredibly important or incredibly redundant.
What sort of content does the concept of a ‘schema’ carry? How, after all, is it suppose to enlighten, supplement or expand our concept of understanding? As far can I see, the only specific thing Kant says in this connection is that having a schema for a ‘dog’ is like possessing a dim image of a ‘dog’, which I can compare to the objects in my inituition thus identifying them as dogs [Kant’s example, CPR, B 180] – But this is ostensibly wrong, my understanding does not and cannot rest upon comparison with a picture of whatever nature, since this picture would itself have to be schematized in order to apply to real objects of experience. What we need to explain is exactly how my mental imagery and the real objects of my experience can be alike at all, and it’s no explanation to say that are indeed alike. Well, of course, they are. No shit, Sherlock.
PS: I know that I’m not very faithful to Kant’s own problematic here, its placement within the architecture of CPR etc.. I know. But.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)